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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE BASIC LAW
U
Berry F.C. Hsu*
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Basic Law)
provides that the judiciary must exercise its power independently, free from any
interference, that its members enjoy judicial immunity, and that judges be given
tenure to ensure their independence. The Basic Law has embodied the doctrine of
separation of powers by vesting specific powers in the Executive Government,
Legislative Council, and judiciary respectively. It provides that judges be appointed
by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission, and
that only the judiciary may exercise the judicial power of the HKSAR. These
provisions were enacted to safeguard judicial independence. However, as regards
members of the judiciary other than judges, the Basic Law maintains the previous
system of appointment and removal. Under this system, the Chief Justice appoints
deputy magistrates and deputy District Court and High Court judges, and the Chief
Executive appoints permanent magistrates by warrant and temporary High Court
judges as recorders. The power to appoint also includes the power to dismiss or
suspend. It is argued that these practices violate the doctrine of judicial independence
under the Basic Law, and accordingly should be replaced so as to ensure judicial
independence in all judicial appointments.
Introduction
In the colonial period, Hong Kong's constitutional documents did not pro-
vide for judicial independence other than securing the tenure of Supreme
Court and District Court judges.' Independence was otherwise left to consti-
tutional conventions.2 Since 1997, however, the concept of judicial
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independence has been firmly established by the Basic Law. Article 88, for
example, provides that judges of the courts of the HKSAR shall be appointed
by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commission.
Yet in contemporary Hong Kong deputy magistrates, deputy District Court
judges, and deputy High Court judges are appointed by the Chief Justice under
ordinance. Are their appointments constitutional? The Basic Law maintains
"the previous system of appointment and removal of members of the judiciary
other than judges".' If, as is discussed below, deputy judges are members of the
judiciary other than judges, the Chief Justice is properly empowered to appoint
them. But are deputy judges, once appointed, able to act independently and
free from interference, as required by the Basic Law?
This article first explores the concept of judicial independence under the
doctrine of the separation of powers in the Basic Law. Then it discusses judi-
cial power and the importance of its exclusive exercise by an independent
judiciary. Finally, HKSAR legislation which contravenes judicial indepen-
dence and the Basic Law is deconstructed and its flaws exposed.'
Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers Under the Basic
Law'
Judicial independence is a cardinal feature of the Basic Law, as has been
expressly provided for in three separate provisions. Under the general
principles, the HKSAR is to exercise a high degree of autonomy with inde-
pendent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.6 In dealing with
the relationship between the Central People's Government and the HKSAR,
the Basic Law again specifically makes it clear that the HKSAR shall be vested
with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, on
matters within the autonomy of the Region.' Finally, it is stated that the
courts of the HKSAR shall exercise judicial power independently, free from
any interference.' The repetition of the reference to exercising judicial power
Art 91 of the Basic Law.
4 The courts discussed in this paper are the specific courts and not special courts, such as the Small
Claims Tribunal and the Labour Tribunal, provided for under Art 81 of the Basic Law. Objective
rather than subjective criteria are used in determining whether a judicial officer is independent.
There are always exceptions to the common perceptions, but the constitutional mechanisms to
protect judicial independence aim to ensure that justice must be seen to be done. In case of ambiguity,
the Chinese version of the Basic Law, which is its only authentic version, is referred to.
5 P. Wesley-Smith, "Executive Orders and the Basic Law" in Alice Lee (ed), Law Lectures for Practi-
tioners 1998 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Law Journal Ltd, 1998), pp 187-209; "Individual and
Institutional Independence of the Judiciary" in Steve Tsang (ed), Judicial Independence and the Rule
of Law in Hong Kong (New York: Palgrave, 2001), ch 5.
6 Art 2 of the Basic Law.
7 Ibid., Art 19.
8 Ibid., Art 85.
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independently demonstrates the important role expected of the judiciary. Some
may argue that this repetition reflects poor drafting. However, one may also
argue that it reflects the determination of the National People's Congress to
uphold judicial independence in the HKSAR.
Judicial independence is commonly understood as a common law
doctrine to protect judges from being interfered with in performing their
functions. As a form of liberty, judicial independence has both negative and
positive aspects in that it enables judges to avoid a distinct source of coercion
and it provides judges the freedom to pursue the truth, the good, the just, and
the law.9 The boundary between these aspects, however, is blurred. The
concept entails freedom from physical compulsion,"o pecuniary consequence,"
personal ambition," and political control." In Valente v The Queen,4 the
Supreme Court of Canada spelled out the essential conditions for judicial
independence: (i) security of tenure - a judge should be removable only for
cause related to capacity to perform judicial functions; (ii) financial security -
the right to salary or pension must be established by law; and (iii) institutional
independence - with respect to matters of administration bearing directly on
the exercise of the judicial function. As a framework for judicial independence,
the Basic Law provides for judicial immunity, an independent appointment
process, and security of tenure for judges" (which will be discussed in the
following sections).
Judicial independence is an aspect of the separation of powers, which is
based on the concept that each branch of government should have a degree
of independence from the others. In the United States of America, the con-
cept of judicial independence, which forms an integral part of the separation
of powers in its constitution, has been criticised by some academics there as
only partly in operation." Contrary to popular belief, the concept is still
rather murky in Great Britain," being asserted rather than legally defined.'
For example, the head of the judiciary is the politically appointed Lord
Chancellor, who also serves as a minister of the Crown and as the speaker of
the House of Lords. Without any scientific evidence, the Lord Chancellor is
considered politically neutral in appointing judges.19 In reality, relying on the
9 P. Karlan, "Two Concepts of Judicial Independence" (1999) 72 South California Law Review 535, at
p 536.
10 Ibid., p 537.
"1 Ibid., p 538.
12 Ibid., p 540.
'3 Ibid., p 5 43 .
'4 [1985]2 SCR 673.
15 Arts 88 to 93 of the Basic Law.
16 R. Stevens, "The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case of England" (1999) 72 South California
Law Review 597.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p 598.
19 K. Malleson, The New Judiciary (London: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999), pp 83-85.
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good faith of an office-holder defies common sense. The recent initiatives by
the British Government to abolish the Lord Chancellorship and remove senior
judges from the parliamentary House of Lords have met with opposition
from the judges.20 Judicial independence, however, is an idealist concept. The
extent of judicial independence very much depends not only on the Basic Law,
but also on the judges themselves, as well as the political structure and legal
culture.21 A truly independent judiciary may well depend on each member of
the judiciary rather than protective measures provided by the constitution and
statute law. Full judicial independence is possible only if a judge is himself
independent. Therefore, whilst the provisions in the Basic Law which safe-
guard judicial independence should set the minimal acceptable standard, other
common law doctrines safeguarding judicial independence cannot be ignored.
In Gupta v President of India,22 Justice Venkataramiah said:
"A Judge is a human being who is a bundle of passions and prejudices, likes
and dislikes, affection and ill-will, hatred and contempt and fear and
recklessness. In order to be a successful Judge these elements should be curbed
and kept under restraint and that is possible only by ... a sense of humility
and dedication to duty. These curbs can neither be bought in the market
nor injected into the human system by the written or unwritten laws."
The guarantee of the judiciary as an independent branch of government
in the HKSAR goes beyond the fundamental doctrine that each branch of
government should perform its own functions independently. The judiciary
should be given sufficient power to sustain its own existence and repel inter-
ference from other branches of government.23 The judicial branch in most
countries is considered the least powerful branch of government, as it always
runs the risk of being influenced by other branches and its only influence is
its judgments." The great French jurist, Charles de Secondat, Baron de
Montesquieu (1689-1755) once wrote, "Of the three powers ... the judiciary
is in some measure next to nothing"." Protection in the written constitution
20 "The mother of parliamentary rows", The Economist Global Agenda (London, 9 Mar 2004); "Judges
and the constitution - Wigs on the warpath", The Economist (London, 13 Mar 2004), p 54.
21 S. Shetreet, "Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges"
in S. Shetreet and J. Deschenes (ed), Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), p 595.
22 AIR (1982) Supreme Court 149, at p 67 2 .
23 R.N. Wilentz, "Separation of Powers - Judicial Independence in the 19 80s" (1997) 49 Rutgers Law
Review 835, at p 836.
24 A. Hamilton, J. Jay and J. Madison, The Federalist (New York: The Modem Library, 1937), p 504.25 C.B. de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, translated by Thomas Nugent (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche,
2001), p 177.
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is an attempt to guarantee that "the least powerful branch" maintains its
important position in the constitutional scheme.
The Australian Commonwealth Constitution does not expressly provide
for the separation of powers. Nevertheless, it entrenches this doctrine by vest-
ing specific legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Commonwealth
parliament, executive government, and judiciary respectively.26 Such a divi-
sion of the constitution could not have been treated merely as a convenient
arrangement by its architects. Both the Basic Law and the Australian Com-
monwealth Constitution have structures similar to those of the United States
Constitution, which similarly does not expressly provide for the separation of
powers.27 The Basic Law embodies the doctrine of the separation of powers
by providing that specific executive, legislative and judicial powers are to be
vested in the Chief Executive and Government, the Legislative Council, and
the judiciary of the HKSAR respectively." The powers vested in the execu-
tive and legislative branches under the Basic Law are very detailed and specific.
It seems that the Basic Law is intended to restrict the powers of each branch
of government by specifically vesting the enumerated powers in each of them.
The Basic Law's provisions expressly enumerate the powers of the Chief
Executive and the Government.29 These powers conform to the traditional
view that the executive functions involve performing particular acts or issu-
ing particulars orders in accordance with the law. Its provisions also expressly
state the powers of the Legislative Council.30 Such powers fall within the
traditional view that legislative functions involve the formulation of rules of
general application and the supervision of the executive government. There
is no provision in the Basic Law that empowers the Executive Government
or the Legislative Council to exercise any powers exceeding those specifically
26 The relevant provisions in the Commonwealth Constitution are: s 1 which provides "The legisla-
tive power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, which shall consist of the
Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives, and which is hereinafter called 'The Parliament'
or 'The Parliament of the Commonwealth"'; s 61 which provides "The executive power of the
Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's
representative, and to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution and of the laws of the
Commonwealth"; and Art 71 which provides "The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be
vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia; and in such other
federal courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction.
The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices not less than two, as the
Parliament prescribes."
27 The relevant provisions in the United States Constitution are: s 1, Art I, which provides "All
legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives"; s 1, Art II, which provides "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America"; and s 1, Art III, which
provides "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such other inferior courts as the Congress from time to time may ordain or establish."
28 Arts 48, 62, 72, 73 and 80 of the Basic Law.
29 Ibid., Arts 48 and 62.
30 Ibid., Arts 72 and 73.
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provided therein." None of the powers vested in the executive government
or the Legislative Council of the HKSAR involves the exercise of judicial
power. Therefore, the provisions of the Basic Law are designed to have judi-
cial power exercised exclusively by the judiciary. This can only be achieved if
members of the judiciary are independent of the executive government and
the Legislative Council.
Judicial Power of the HKSAR
As members of the judiciary have to exercise their judicial power independently,
what constitutes judicial power warrants further discussion. The Basic Law pro-
vides that the structure, powers, and functions of the courts of the HKSAR
shall be prescribed by law.32 The powers and functions of the courts, however,
must be restricted to the judicial power of the HKSAR, as the courts can only
exercise judicial power and powers incidental to them. The Basic Law has spe-
cifically stated that the courts of the HKSAR have jurisdiction over all cases
within the HKSAR, save for matters which are beyond the autonomy of the
HKSARY It does not, however, expressly define judicial power. Therefore,
precedents from other common law jurisdictions must be consulted. There is
no easy answer, as illustrated by Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission," where the Australian High Court said:
"Difficulty arises in attempting to formulate a comprehensive definition
of judicial power not so much because it consists of a number of factors as
because the combination is not always the same. It is hard to point to any
essential or constant characteristic. Moreover, there are functions which,
when performed by a court, constitute the exercise of judicial power but,
when performed by some other body, do not ... One is tempted to say
that, in the end, judicial power is the power exercised by courts and can
only be defined by reference to what courts do and the way in which they
do it, rather than by recourse to any other classification of functions. But
that would be to place reliance upon the elements of history and policy
which, whilst they are legitimate considerations, cannot be conclusive."
31 There are no residual powers of any sort. At common law, residual powers are exercised by the State
as a form of prerogative power. After 30 June 1997, the residual executive and legislative powers of
the HKSAR are exercised by the Central People's Government.
32 Art 83 of the Basic Law.
Ibid., Arts 19 and 158.
34 (1994-1995) ALR 1, at p 16.
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At common law, the function of the judiciary is to declare what the law is
and to interpret legislation. Judicial power is the power "to adjudicate between
adverse parties as to legal claims ... and to order right to be done". 5 It concerns
"the ascertainment, declaration and enforcement of the rights and liabilities of
the parties as they exist ... at the moment the proceedings are instituted ...
Enforcement [is peculiar to judicial power]".36 In other words, the exercise of
judicial power involves the application of pre-existing standards rather than
formulation of policy or the exercise of an administrative discretion. 7 In
deciding cases involving the existence of judicial power, the common law
courts have produced a number of tests which, when applied to the statutory
provision in question, determine whether or not a power purportedly granted
or being exercised by any body is in fact judicial." An example is the distinc-
tion between judicial power and arbitral power. The latter power only
ascertains and declares, but does not enforce, what in the opinion of the
arbitrator are the respective rights and liabilities of the disputing parties.39
That is, it creates rights and duties of the parties in regulating their future
relations." Judicial power, on the other hand, declares rights and duties on
the basis of the law as it stands in the light of past conduct and it enforces
those rights"1 (if this distinction seems obscure, it reflects the difficulty in
formulating a comprehensive definition of judicial power). When an arbitra-
tor determines a dispute by applying law to the past conduct of the parties
and issues a binding order, judicial power is in fact exercised. Judicial deci-
sions must be definitive and declare rights conclusively, and must be based on
legal principles. Therefore, judges when reviewing executive decisions can-
not go into the merits of a case (except for the purpose of establishing
irrationality), as this would involve the exercise of administrative discretion.
In ensuring that judicial power is exercised, and independently exercised,
only by the judiciary, non-judicial tribunals which exercise this power should
not be permitted.42 Otherwise, the right of citizens to appear before an inde-
pendent judiciary is diminished and the role of the judiciary marginalised.
The following example illustrates this issue. In the HKSAR, under the In-
land Revenue Ordinance, the Board of Review makes final decisions on
3 Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v]. W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434.
36 Ibid., at pp 463, 465.
3 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1994-1995) ALR 1, at p 17.
38 Re Tracey, Ex p Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518; R. v Davison (1954) 90 CLR 353.
39 See Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia (n 35 above), p 46 3.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 P. Wesley-Smith, "Judges and Judicial Power under the Hong Kong Basic Law" (2004) 34 HKLJ 83.
43 Cap 112, Laws of Hong Kong.
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facts and its decision on law can be appealed to the High Court." The Board
of Review can impose fines and award costs," but only the District Court can
enforce its judgment." In Commissioner of Inland Revenue and the Board of
Review, Ex p Herald Ltd, 7 the Court of Appeal held that the Board of Review
is obliged to act like a judicial tribunal and must follow legal precedents and
strict procedures notwithstanding that it falls within the category of an ad-
ministrative tribunal. According to the Privy Council in Shell Co of Australia
Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,48 the above functions of the Board of
Review are an exercise of judicial power. In Brandy v Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission49 it was held that it makes no difference whether the
court acts as an agent in enforcing the payment. The crucial point is that,
when a tribunal exercises judicial power, its members do not have security of
tenure under the Basic Law and are not independent."o In lieu of the Board of
Review, appeals against decisions of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue
ought be made to the Administrative Appeals Board, which was established
to hear appeals against certain administrative decisions and to exercise ad-
ministrative discretion.'
Judicial Independence and Other Provisions of the Basic Law
The Basic Law expressly asserts its own supremacy over all other laws in the
HKSAR. Accordingly, no law enacted by the Legislative Council can con-
travene a provision of the Basic Law, including any of the three "judicial
independence" articles.52 Therefore, the judicial system, including the meth-
ods of appointment and removal of members of the judiciary other than judges
as practised in former Hong Kong, can be maintained only if the implement-
ing ordinances do not contravene the Basic Law's unequivocal requirement
of judicial independence. A purposive rather than a mechanistic approach
should be taken in construing the Basic Law. Any system of judicial appoint-
ment which may potentially bring about impairment or compromise of or
prejudice to the independent exercise of judicial power must be avoided at all
costs, leaving no room for doubt that compliance with the Basic Law has
44 Ibid., s 69(1).
5 Ibid., ss 68(8) and (9).
46 Ibid., s 75.
47 [19641 HKLR 224, at pp 231, 236.
48 (1930) 44 CLR 530, at p 543.
49 (1994-1995) ALR 1, at p 17.
50 B. Hsu, Laws of Taxation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2001), pp 42-43.
51 Administrative Appeals Board Ordinance (Cap 442).
52 Ibid., Art 11.
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been achieved. The purposive approach is strengthened by other provisions
of the Basic Law, which can only be meaningful when an independent judi-
ciary exists.
The Basic Law provides that all residents in the HKSAR are equal before
the law." This would imply that a resident is entitled to be tried by a fair and
impartial tribunal. The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights as applied to the former Hong Kong are to remain in
force and they have been implemented in the laws of the HKSAR." This
covenant states that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law","
which is also provided by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance." In crimi-
nal proceedings, the Basic Law guarantees that an accused person has the
right to a fair trial by the judiciary without delay." These provisions can only
be honoured by an independent judiciary.
The Basic Law further guarantees that all HKSAR residents shall have
the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers
for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation
in courts, and judicial remedies." It also provides that all HKSAR residents
shall have the right to institute legal proceedings against the Executive
Government.59 These rights can only be upheld if there is an independent
judiciary, as well as an independent legal profession.
Temporary and Part-time Judges and Magistrates
In Great Britain the London and Westminster Police Bill of 1785, which
would have appointed senior barristers to act as "occasional judges", was with-
drawn after public outcry.60 There were concerns that these occasional judges
might be biased in seeking to please the executive government in exchange
for rewards in their careers.6' Nevertheless the modem judicial system in Brit-
ain encompasses deputy judges appointed on a temporary basis and recorders
5 Ibid., Art 26.
5 Ibid., Art 39.
5 Art 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
56 Art 10 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights; s 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap 383).
5 Art 87 of the Basic Law.
58 Ibid., Art 35.
5 Ibid.
60 L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750 (London: Stevens,
1956), pp 119-120.
61 Ibid.
Vol 34 Part 2
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appointed on a part-time basis.62 This system was adopted by the former Hong
Kong colony and inherited by the HKSAR, where deputy judges are appointed
to sit for an average period of six to seven months and recorders sit for four
weeks each year.63 Under the British system these temporary and part-time
judgeships are normally seen as not incompatible with judicial independence
as their appointment and re-appointment are made by the Lord Chancellor,
the head of the judiciary, 64 even though he is a member of the government.
The advantages of this system in alleviating the workload of permanent judges,
however, should be weighed against its flaws. 5 In the HKSAR in 2003,
the average number of District Court deputy judges and High Court deputy
judges sitting in each month respectively were 10.66 However there were only
30 permanent District Court judges and 24 permanent High Court judges."
These figures demonstrate that the judiciary has a substantial proportion of
temporary and part-time personnel.
Magistrates' courts dispose of over 99 per cent of criminal cases6 and have
jurisdiction over summary offences as well as some indictable offences on a
summary basis.69 They may impose sentences of up to three years' imprison-
ment under specific ordinances and a fine of HK$500,000. Therefore, the
independence of magistrates - as well, of course, of deputy judges and record-
ers - is vital to the integrity of the entire judicial system. However, as will be
discussed later in this article, magistrates do not enjoy full judicial immunity
and they can be easily dismissed.
The Validity of judicial Appointments
The Basic Law provides that judges of the courts of the HKSAR are appointed
by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an independent commis-
sion composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent
62 R. Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary - The View from the Lord Chancellor's Office (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp 164, 169; Proposals for the Reform of Recorder and Deputy High Court
Judge Tenure (London: Department of Constitutional Affairs, May 2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/
consult/judiciary/proreften.htm#cons (visited 1 Apr 2004).
63 "Access to Information - Recorders & Deputy Judges", letter dated 6 Apr 2004 from the Judiciary
Administration to the author.
64 D.B. Casson and I.R. Scott, "Judicial Independence by Jurisdiction - Great Britain" in Shetreet
and Deschenes (n 21 above), pp 147-148.
65 See Shetreet (n 21 above), pp 625-627.
66 See n 63 above.
67 Ibid.
68 Statistics (2001-2002) (Hong Kong: The Judiciary, 2003), http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/other-info/
stat.htm (visited 1 Dec 2003).
69 Sections 91 and 92 of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227).
288 Berry F.C. Hsu (2004) HKLJ
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persons from other sectors." This provision, part of the constitutional frame-
work designed to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, was implemented
by the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance.' The
commission, which appoints judges, must be independent and it must
consider the judicial and professional qualities of the candidates as provided
by the Basic Law.72 However, there is no transparency in the appointment
process and the Chief Executive is not bound to appoint all persons recom-
mended by the independent commission though he may appoint no other
persons.7 Although the courts in the HKSAR include the Court of Final
Appeal (CFA), the High Court, District Court, magistrates' courts, and other
special courts," there is no express provision in the Basic Law that members
of these courts must be "judges". The two issues that arise are: who may exer-
cise judicial power and who are members of the judiciary other than judges?
According to the Basic Law, the courts of the HKSAR shall be the judi-
ciary exercising the judicial power7 1 of the HKSAR.16 It is not expressly stated
that only "judges" can exercise such judicial power. Under the relevant
ordinances, all temporary and part-time members of the judiciary may
exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges of their permanent
counterparts.77 They are also assigned the same duties." Can the judicial
power of the HKSAR be exercised by temporary and part-time members of
the judiciary? This depends on the previous judicial system, as inherited by
the HKSAR - on the assumption that temporary and part-time judges are
"members of the judiciary other than judges".
The Basic Law maintains the previous judicial system except those changes
consequent upon the establishment of the CFA of the HKSAR,79 and retains
the previous system of appointment and removal of members of the judiciary
70 Art 88 of the Basic Law.
71 Cap 92.
72 Art 92 of the Basic Law.
73 The Chinese version of the Basic Law states that persons recommended by the independent com-
mission "are appointed by the Chief Executive". Contrast its English version which uses the wording
"shall be appointed by the Chief Executive". Contrast J. Cottrell and Y. Ghai, "Between Two
Systems of Law: The Judiciary in Hong Kong" in P. Russell and D. O'Brien (ed), Judicial Indepen-
dence in the Age of Democracy (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2001), p
212, who said, "in practice the recommendations of the JORC are treated as binding, as the Basic
Law requires".
7 Art 84 of the Basic Law.
7 The meaning of judicial power has been discussed in the "Judicial Power of the HKSAR" section of
this article.
7 Art 80 of the Basic Law.
n Section 5A(2) of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227); s 7(2 ) of the District Court Ordinance
(Cap 336); ss 6A(3) and 10(2) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4).
78 See n 63 above. This information was confirmed again in a telephone conversation between the
author and Ms B. Leung of the Judiciary Administration on 8 Apr 2004.
7 Art 81 of the Basic Law.
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other than judges." The "previous system" is probably intended to be the
system at the time when China resumed the exercise of sovereignty over Hong
Kong, that is, the system as it was on 1 July 1997.
The drafting of the Basic Law in respect to judges and other members of the
judiciary, however, is far from satisfactory." It distinguishes between judges
and other members of the judiciary, but does not define them.82 The drafting
committee must have had in mind the Interpretation and General Clauses
Ordinance, which defines "judges" and includes within the term deputy High
Court judges and recorders, but not magistrates, District Court judges, and
registrars." This definition of judges, including deputy judges, was amended in
1994 to include recorders" and again in 1997 when an amendment replaced
"Justice of Appeal" by "a judge of the Court of Final Appeal"." Magistrates,
District Court judges and registrars are thus not "judges" although deputy High
Court judges and recorders are. In any event, under the Basic Law judicial power
may be exercised by members of the judiciary who are not judges, to the extent
that the previous system provided. The Basic Law is not concerned with whether
these other members of the judiciary are temporary or part-time. Therefore,
other members of the judiciary who are not judges, eg magistrates, District Court
judges, and deputy District Court judges, which were established prior to 1997,
may continue to be appointed to exercise judicial power in the same manner
under the previous system subject to contrary provisions of the Basic Law such
as the "judicial independence" provisions." The same cannot be said for deputy
magistrates, which were created only in 1999.7
It is legitimate to rely on an ordinance to identify which judicial officers
are "judges", either because it was part of the previous system recognised by
the Basic Law or because ordinary legislation may properly supplement or
clarify a constitutional provision. It would therefore appear that magistrates,
deputy District Court judges, District Court judges, and registrars may
continue to be appointed as under the previous system, but not deputy High
Court judges and recorders.
80 Ibid., Arts 81 and 91.
81 See Cottrell and Ohai (n 73 above), p 213.
82 Arts 91 to 93 of the Basic Law.
83 Section 3 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1). Although the Basic Law is
not a piece of HKSAR legislation, and therefore is not formally interpreted in the light of Cap 1, it
is submitted that where it is an institution of the HKSAR legal system that is referred to it is
appropriate to look to Cap 1.
84 Section 58 of the Ordinance No 92 of 1975; s 7 of the Ordinance No 49 of 1983; s 10 of the
Ordinance No 80 of 1994.
85 Version: 1 Jul 1997.
86 Magistrates, the District Court (s 3 of the Ordinance No 24 of 1949 and s 3 of the Ordinance No 1
of 1953) and deputy District Court judges (s 6 of the Ordinance No 21 of 1962) were all created
prior to 1997.
87 Section 13 of the Ordinance No 21 of 1999.
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The provisions governing appointment of magistrates, deputy judges,
and recorders are as follows. The Magistrates Ordinance provides that the
Chief Executive may appoint magistrates by warrant and the Chief Justice
may appoint deputy magistrates." The Judicial Officers Recommendation
Commission (JORC) advises and makes recommendations to the Chief
Executive on appointing magistrates other than deputy magistrates.89 The
Chief Justice may appoint deputy District Court judges and deputy High
Court judges under the District Court Ordinance90 and High Court Ordi-
nance respectively." The Chief Executive may appoint recorders under
the High Court Ordinance,9 2 based on the advice and recommendation of
the JORC.93
It appears that (a) the appointment of deputy magistrates (who are mem-
bers of the judiciary but the category was not established under the previous
system) is not covered by the Basic Law; (b) the appointment of deputy Dis-
trict Court judges is validated under the previous system; but (c) deputy High
Court judges, being "judges" under the Basic Law, ought to be appointed in
the same manner as permanent judges, thus by the Chief Executive and not
by the Chief Justice.
Security of Tenure for Judges
In protecting the independence of the judiciary, the Basic Law provides that
a judge may only be removed for "inability to discharge his or her duties, or
for misbehaviour" by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an in-
dependent tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the CFA consisting of
at least three local judges.94 The endorsement of the Legislative Council is
also required for the removal of a Court of Appeal judge and the Chief Judge
of the High Court.95 The Chief Justice of the CFA may be removed only for
inability to discharge his or her duties or for misbehaviour by the Chief
Executive on the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the Chief
Executive consisting of at least five local judges." The Basic Law also
88 Sections 5 and 5A of the Magistrates Ordinance (Cap 227).
8 Section 6 and Sch I of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance (Cap 92).
90 Section 7 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336).
91 Section 10(1) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4).
92 Ibid., s 6A.
93 Section 5 and Sch 1 of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Ordinance.
94 Art 89 of the Basic Law.
9 Ibid., Art 90.
96 Ibid., Art 89.
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provides judicial immunity97 and, as we have seen, special appointment
procedures for judges.98 It would be inconsistent to protect judicial indepen-
dence in such ways while allowing a body not subject to them to exercise
judicial power.
There is a general legislative provision that the power to appoint includes
the power to dismiss or suspend." Accordingly, the deputy judges of the Dis-
trict Court and the High Court hold their offices at the pleasure of the Chief
Justice,0 and the recorders of the High Court hold their offices at the pleasure
of the Chief Executive. As recorders are appointed by the Chief Executive on
the advice and recommendation of the JORC,'o it is arguable that the termi-
nation of appointment of a recorder requires similar consultation.102
These temporary and part-time judges have all the jurisdiction, powers
and privileges and perform all the duties of a permanent judge of the
respective courts," but they do not enjoy the security of tenure of perma-
nent judges as provided by the Basic Law.'0 As these members of the
judiciary, like magistrates and deputy magistrates, exercise full judicial power,
they should be able to act independently, free from any interference.10 It
may be perceived that these members of the judiciary would subconsciously
read the minds of those who may remove or re-appoint them at their pleasure.
Mr Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court considered the appointment
of temporary judges objectionable in principle as they clearly lack judicial
independence.'06 In Reference re Territorial Court Act,"' the Northwest
Territories Supreme Court in Canada had to determine whether a full-time
deputy judge with a fixed-term appointment is proper under a constitu-
tional provision which provides the right to be heard by an independent
and impartial tribunal.' It was held that the discretion of the commis-
sioner to appoint or reappoint deputy judges is incompatible with judicial
independence and leads to a perception of partiality. The court held that
the power to revoke the appointment of a deputy judge is constitutionally
impermissible even with the recommendation of the chief judge, as a
97 Ibid., Art 85. For a discussion of judicial immunity under the Basic Law, see Y. Ghai, Hong Kong's
New Constitutional Order (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp 316-318.
98 Arts 88 to 93 of the Basic Law.
99 Section 42 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance.
100 Section 7(4) of the District Court Ordinance; s 10(4) of the High Court Ordinance.
101 Section 5 and Sch 1 of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Ordinance.
102 Gupta and Others v Union of India and Others, AIR (1982) Supreme Court 149, at p 595. In this case,
it was agreed that if the appointment of a retired judge has to be made in consultation with the
Chief Justice, the termination of the appointment will also require similar consultation.
103 Section 7(2) of the District Court Ordinance; ss 6A(3) and 10(2) of the High Court Ordinance.
104 Section 5(5) of the District Court Ordinance; s 11A(5) of the High Court Ordinance.
105 See Ghai (n 97 above), pp 308-316.
106 M. Kirby, Independence of the Judiciary - Basic Principle, New Challenges (Hong Kong: International
Bar Association Human Rights Institute Conference, 12-14 Jun 1998).
107 [1997] Carswell NWT 24, para 126; 152 DLR (4 th) 132; [1998] 1 WWR 733.
108 Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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reasonable, objective observer would not regard this as a sufficient safeguard.
This follows Valente v The Queen,"o' where it was held that:
"The question that now has to be determined is whether a reasonable
person, who was informed of the relevant statutory provisions, their his-
torical background and the traditions surrounding them, after viewing the
matter realistically and practically would conclude that a provincial court
judge ... was a tribunal which could make an independent and impartial
adjudication. In answering this question it is necessary to review once
again the specific concerns which were raised ... and then conclude
whether singly or collectively they would raise a reasonable apprehension
that the tribunal was not independent and impartial so far as its adjudica-
tion was concerned."
In Starrs and Chalmers v Ruxton,"o the Lord Justice Clerk of the Scottish
High Court of Justiciary considered the appointment of temporary sheriffs
(judges) to supplement the work of their permanent counterparts as a
"constitutional innovation". In this case, the court had to determine whether
the Lord Advocate had acted in a way which was incompatible with the rights
of the accused to a fair trial by "an independent and impartial tribunal"
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms."' The Scottish court adopted the same test as in
Valente v The Queen"2 and Reference re Territorial Court Act," ie whether or
not there is a real risk that a well-informed observer would think that a tem-
porary judge might be influenced by his hopes and fears as to his prospective
advancement."I The court held that it is insufficient to rely on practice. The
real issue is whether there is a framework providing protection against im-
proper interference or influence."' The court denied that the practice of
following removal procedures for temporary judges identical to those for their
permanent counterparts was a sufficient safeguard." 6 Accordingly, it held
that the one-year appointment at the pleasure of the Lord Advocate did not
give an appearance of independence."' The executive was able to maintain a
close control over the period for which such a judge holds office."' In
109 [1985] 2 SCR 673, para 13.
no [2000] JC 208; [2000] SLT 42 (Lord Justice Clerk), para 4.
''' Arti 6(1).
112 [1985] 2 SCR 673.
113 See n 107 above.
" Starrs and Chalmers v Ruxton [2000] JC 208; [2000] SLT 42 (Lord Justice Clerk), paras 25-28, 49.
" Ibid., (Lord Justice Clerk), para 28.
116 Ibid., (Lord Prosser), para 10.
" Ibid., (Lord Justice Clerk), para 40.
118 Ibid.
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another Scottish case, Clancy v Caird,"9 it was held that temporary judges
did not necessarily contravene the above provision if there were sufficient
security of tenure and the Crown was not involved in the case. As a conse-
quence of Starrs and Chalmers, the British Government has implemented
measures to safeguard the tenure of recorders. They are now effectively
appointed to the statutory retirement age of seventy subject to good behaviour,
and their five-year appointments are automatically renewed.'20 In May 2003,
the Lord Chancellor issued a consultation paper on reform of the tenure of
deputy High Court judges and recorders. 121
Prima facie, appointing temporary judges is incompatible with the judicial
independence provisions in the Basic Law 22 and contrary to the interests of
the accused, who might be tried by persons who "would have everything to
hope for" from the executive government. 123 The question is whether or not
there are sufficient safeguards to ensure their independence. There is no pro-
hibition on deputy magistrates, deputy judges, and recorders receiving
remuneration from outside the judiciary beyond their terms of appointment.
In reality, their principal sources of income are generally derived from their
private professional practices. When temporary members of the judiciary may
accept instructions from the Secretary for Justice in their capacity as legal
practitioners, their independence is called into question as they are in effect
agents of the executive government while members of the judiciary. There
are no provisions for a "cooling off' period. The classic remark by Lord Hewart
is worth repeating here:
"It is ... of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done,
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."124
The concepts of judicial independence, however, have changed over the
years and opinions differ on what is necessary or desirable or feasible to achieve
this objective.'25 Most people would call for the general adoption of the high-
est standards or safeguards."' In reality, it would not always be feasible to
apply the most rigorous and elaborate conditions of judicial independence to
the constitutional requirement, which may have to be applied to a variety of
tribunals.127 In Reference re Territorial Court Act,' 28 the test laid down by the
"1 [2000] SLT 546.
120 See Proposals for the Reform of Recorder and Deputy High Courtjudge Tenure (n 62 above).
121 Ibid.
122 See Wesley-Smith, "Individual and Institutional Independence" (n 5 above).
123 The quote comes from Radzinowicz's book (n 60 above), p 119.
124 R. v Sussex]], Ex p McCarthy 192411 KB 256.
125 Valente v The Queen 1985] 2 SCR 673, para 25.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 See n 107 above.
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Northwest Territories Supreme Court in Canada is whether a reasonable
observer would consider that the independence of a judge is impaired. The
case established four safeguards for proper appointment of deputy judges, which
may be a model for the HKSAR to implement. They are: (i) the appointment
or reappointment would involve an independent tribunal; (ii) the position
would be secure for the term of the appointment, and there would be no
discretionary power to revoke the appointment before the expiry of the term;
(iii) any revocation or removal must be for cause, and subject to the same
removal process as for permanent judges; and (iv) there should be no differ-
entiation in the total remuneration available for deputy and full judges.
Nevertheless the court permitted appointment to the Bench of sitting
tenured judges from another jurisdiction, inactive lawyers and retired judges,
as no reasonable observer would consider their independence impaired.
In the HKSAR, temporary and part-time judges may be appointed from
other common law jurisdictions, including non-permanent judges to the CFA
under the Basic Law.129 The independence of these judges would be impaired
if the remuneration in their home jurisdictions was lower than in the HKSAR.
The safeguards required in Reference re Territorial Court Act are absent under
the present legislation in the HKSAR. As for retired judges, the Northwest
Territories Supreme Court stated that their appointments would be valid
provided they are prohibited from practising law within the jurisdiction. The
Canadian decision made it clear that appointment of current legal practitio-
ners would definitely be improper, as they could not be seen to be free from
the pressures of government and business.
According to the Canadian safeguards, it would be undesirable for Dis-
trict Court judges to act as deputy High Court judges on a trial basis under
the promotional system for members of the judiciary in the HKSAR. It has
been argued that a policy of not promoting judges may contribute to judicial
independence, as this would take away from judges the incentive to gain favour
with those who could appoint them to more lucrative posts.130 Studies in
Japan have shown that its executive government used control over promo-
tion to penalize judges who declared key electoral law unconstitutional."' In
the United States of America it has been reported that federal judges who
supported higher penalties were more likely to be promoted.'32 In the HKSAR
the number of deputy judges and recorders being appointed to permanent
judgeships is not very high.' There is always a risk that a probationary judge's
129 Arts 82 and 92 of the Basic Law.
130 D. Klerman, "Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence" (1999) 72 South California Law Review
455.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid, pp 455-456.
133 Seven and nine out of about 49 deputy judges and recorders were appointed to permanent
judgeships in 2001 and 2003, respectively. See n 63 above.
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decision would be coloured by his plans for the future, as the opportunity for
permanent appointment is limited.14 There is a perception that he would try
to please those on whose pleasure his reappointment depends"' or those on
whom he might rely for his livelihood when his judicial appointment expires.
These types of probationary or temporary appointments are inconsistent with
numerous international conventions and declarations. The Beijing Statement
of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary requires judges to be pro-
tected by security of tenure." International standards simply disapprove
appointing probationary or temporary judges."' As for appointing legal prac-
titioners as deputy magistrates, deputy judges, and recorders in the HKSAR,
the Territorial Court Act case provided the following wisdom: "One should
not be able to use the judicial role as a means of material self-aggrandisement.
That is exactly what one could be tempted to do by a temporary appointment
knowing that it is merely temporary.""' It has been suggested that the only
way to ensure the independence of these temporary and part-time judges is to
appoint them for a fixed term with no reappointment.
Recorders are appointed on a part-time basis. As discussed earlier, in Great
Britain there was concern that this type of judicial appointment might lead
to dispensing "second-rate justice".139 There were perceptions that the
orderly sequence of court sittings and consistency in sentencing would be
jeopardised.4 0 In R v Lipp6,141 the Supreme Court of Canada held that
appointing legal practitioners as part-time municipal judges does not contra-
vene judicial independence because sufficient safeguards were in place to
minimise the risk of bias. International standards call for appointing
part-time judges with proper safeguards.' 42 These safeguards include the oath
sworn by judges, the code of ethics to which they are subject, and the statu-
tory restrictions in place to avoid conflicts of interest. The court considered
the steps most municipal court judges had taken to make themselves more
134 See Shetreet (n 21 above), p 625.
135 Ibid.
136 Arts 18 and 20 of the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the
Lawasia Region; Arts 11 and 12 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (adopted
by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders held at Milan from 26 Aug to 6 Sep 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions
40/32 of 29 Nov 1985 and 40/146 of 13 Dec 1985).
137 Art 2 3(a) of the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence
(adopted 1982); Art 2.20 of the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (adopted by
the First World Conference on the Independence of Justice, Montreal, Jun 1983).
138 [1997] Carswell NWT 24, para 126.
139 See Shetreet (n 21 above), p 6 26 .
140 Ibid.
141 [1991] Carswell Que 45; t1990] 2 SCR 114.
142 Art 25 of the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (adopted
1982); Article 2.20 (Explanatory Note) of the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice
(adopted by the First World Conference on the Independence of Justice, Montreal, Jun 1983).
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independent and impartial, eg by living and practising law outside their respec-
tive municipal court jurisdictions, and stated that a reasonably well-informed
person with full knowledge of the municipal court system and its safeguards
should not have an apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases. These
safeguards would be difficult to implement in the HKSAR, which has only one
jurisdiction. Although barristers in the HKSAR practise independently in their
own chambers, they are not immune to influence by instructing solicitors, the
Secretary for Justice who may instruct them, and businesses. In any event there
is no relevant legislation regulating judicial conduct and a Guide to Judicial
Conduct is only on the drawing board."' On a positive note, virtually all the
recorders appointed were reappointed during the past three years.'
As for the CFA, permanent judges are appointed by the Chief Executive
on the advice and recommendation of the JORC."' Non-permanent local
judges and judges from other common law jurisdictions are appointed by the
Chief Executive under similar procedures and two lists of such appointments
are compiled.14' All these judges may be removed only for an inability to
discharge their duty or for misbehaviour and only by the Chief Executive on
the recommendation of a tribunal in accordance with the procedures pro-
vided by the Basic Law. 14 The appointment or removal of any judge of the
CFA, whether permanent or non-permanent," must be endorsed by the Leg-
islative Council and be reported to the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress. 149 To minimise conflicts of interest, all these judges are
debarred from practising law in the HKSAR forever.'o Although the chance
that they may be influenced by multinational corporations cannot be ruled
out, the possibility that this would happen is virtually nil. Prima facie, it
appears that judicial independence is assured in the CFA. A non-permanent
judge, however, holds office for a term of three years, which may be extended
for one or more periods of three years by the Chief Executive on the recom-
mendation of the Chief Justice.'51 This may create a perception that
non-permanent judges could be influenced by fear that their ideology and
jurisprudence are not endorsed by the Chief Justice or the Chief Executive.
143 See n 63 above; "CJ's Speech at Ceremonial Opening of Legal Year 2004" (Hong Kong: The Judiciary,
12 Jan 2004), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200401/12/0112136.htm (visited 6 Apr 2004).
144 See n 63 above.
145 Section 7 of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.
146 Ibid., ss 8 and 9.
147 Art 89 of the Basic Law; ss 14(7) and (8) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.
148 Non-permanent judges include judges from other common law jurisdictions: s 2 of the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance.
149 Ibid., s 7A.
1o Ibid., s 13.
1 Ibid., s 14(4).
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As the CFA may invite non-permanent judges to sit on it,'52 the entire
process should be transparent and prescribed by law in ensuring that there is
no appearance of bias in selecting the panel members. There is always a
concern that non-permanent judges may be invited to sit in the CFA so as to
affect the outcome of the cases.'
The Magistrates' Ordinance provides that the Chief Executive may
appoint magistrates by warrant"' on the advice and recommendation of the
JORC."' Magistrates may be appointed on a permanent basis or fixed-term
contract."' The warrant stipulates whether a magistrate is permanent or fixed
term.'M There is no guarantee that, in the latter case, the contract will be
renewed. In any event, a warrant appointing a magistrate may be revoked at
any time by the Chief Executive without any cause,158 and a deputy magis-
trate holds office at the pleasure of the Chief Justice.159
Appeals from the magistrates' courts lie to the Court of First Instance.' 60
Those members of the legal profession who moonlight as deputy High Court
judges or recorders, regularly or from time to time, may be put in a moral
dilemma when they are asked to represent their clients in magistrates' courts.
As they wield full judicial power when they sit in the High Court, the pres-
sure on the magistrates and their learned friends on the other side of the bar
may be palpably felt. Any appeal hearing they preside over may have
repercussions, as they may appear in magistrates' courts. Under the inherited
judicial promotion system of colonial Hong Kong, the last thing a magistrate
who has any ambition for higher office would prefer is to have many of his or
her decisions successfully appealed. Moreover, all decisions of superior courts,
including decisions made by these moonlighting judges, bind magistrates'
courts. A conflict of interest would arise if any of these decisions were
relevant to their clients' case in the magistrates' courts. Judicial independence,
fair play in the legal profession, and equality before the law may perceivably
be challenged.
Moreover, if not all members of the judiciary enjoy judicial independence,
the system can be manipulated by the government. The choice of venue for
152 Ibid., ss 5(2) and (3).
1 For a discussion of appointing temporary judges, see Shetreet (n 21 above), p 627. One expects that
the footnote will give support to the risk identified in the text - but it does not do so.1 Section 5 of the Magistrates Ordinance.
1 Section 6 and Sch 1 of the Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission Ordinance.
156 M. Chui, Justice Without Fear or Favour: Reflections of a Chinese Magistrate in Colonial Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publications Ltd., 1999), p 3.
157 Ibid., p 2: an example of this warrant may be found here.
158 Section 5(5) of the Magistrates Ordinance.
1 Section 42 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance.
160 Sections 105 and 113 of the Magistrates Ordinance.
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prosecution is always the privilege of the Secretary for Justice.' 1 In border-
line cases, the prosecution may choose the magistrates' courts, whose members
are not independent. There is no equality before the law as judicial indepen-
dence depends on the level of court, the type of appointment of the sitting
member of the judiciary, and the pleasure of the Secretary for Justice.
Judicial Immunity
The Basic Law provides that members of the judiciary are immune from legal
action in the performance of their judicial functions.162 The judicial immu-
nity provided by the Basic Law covers all members of the judiciary in the
performance of their judicial functions.' The Basic Law makes no distinc-
tion between levels of courts. Therefore, the extent of immunity ought to be
the same for all members of the judiciary. However, at common law, immu-
nity is only available to judges and magistrates and the degree of immunity
available depends on the level of court. 6 Judges of inferior courts normally
enjoy immunity if they are acting within the scope of their jurisdiction and it
is immaterial whether or not they are acting in good faith.165 The extension
of judicial immunity to all members of the judiciary, and not just judges, gives
effect to the intention expressed in the Basic Law to uphold a truly indepen-
dent judiciary. In a leading English case, Sirros v Moore, 66 the Court of Appeal
made an idealist though not universally accepted statement:"I
"Every judge of the courts of this land - from the highest to the lowest -
should be protected to the same degree and liable to the same degree. If
the reason underlying this immunity is to ensure 'that they may be free in
thought and independent in judgment', it applies to every judge, what-
ever his rank. Each should be protected from liability to damages when he
is acting judicially. Each should be able to do his work in complete inde-
pendence free from fear ... What he does may be outside his jurisdiction -
in fact or in law - but so long as he honestly believes it to be within his
161 Art 63 of the Basic Law provides that the Department of Justice shall control criminal prosecutions,
free from any interference.
162 Art 85 of the Basic Law.
163 Ibid.
164 See Ghai (n 97 above), pp 316-317.
165 Ibid.
166 [1975] QB 118, at p 136.
167 It is considered by the author to represent an ideal because it provides full judicial immunity. However,
it is not accepted in all cases. For discussions, see Ghai (n 97 above), pp 316-317.
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jurisdiction - he should not be liable ... Nothing will make him liable
except it is shown that he was not acting judicially ... knowing that he
had no jurisdiction to do it."
The Magistrates Ordinance and the District Court Ordinance provide
lesser standards of judicial immunity than those enjoyed by the superior
courts. The Magistrates Ordinance protects magistrates from action for any
act done in the execution of his or her duty with respect to any matter
within his or her jurisdiction, unless such act was done maliciously and
without reasonable and probable cause.' For any act done by a magistrate
without or in excess of his or her jurisdiction, there is no need to prove that
the act was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. 169
The District Court Ordinance provides that judges in the District Court
enjoy judicial immunity except where there is malice and absence of
reasonable and probable cause.17o These provisions are in line with the
established common law doctrine that only superior court judges enjoy
full judicial immunity. The Basic Law, however, makes no differentiation
between superior and inferior courts and extends judicial immunity to all
courts and all members of the judiciary, including magistrates and registrars.
Therefore, these ordinances provide merely the minimum safeguards for
magistrates and District Court judges.
All legislation in the HKSAR must be compatible with the Basic Law.
Arguably, the judicial immunity provisions in the Magistrates Ordinance and
the District Court Ordinance are ultra vires the Basic Law and should be
repealed. Given that the judges themselves may construe any ambiguity in
favour of wider judicial immunity,171 the judicial immunity provisions in the
Magistrates Ordinance and District Court Ordinance may be redundant."'
After all, the extent of judicial immunity under the Basic Law has yet to be
determined by the CFA. However, there is still concern by some that "the
performance of their judicial functions" may be interpreted narrowly by the
CFA, and covers only acts within their jurisdiction."'7 This narrow approach
seems to be unlikely to be adopted. As it is still uncertain how the judicial
immunity provision in the Basic Law is to be interpreted, a better approach
is to repeal the relevant provisions in the above ordinances and allow the
question to be regulated by the Basic Law.
168 Section 125 of the Magistrates Ordinance.
169 Ibid., s 126.
170 Section 71 of the District Court Ordinance.
171 See Cottrell and Ghai (n 73 above), p 214.
172 See Ghai (n 97 above), p 318 .
173 See Cottrell and Ghai (n 73 above), p 214.
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Conclusion
The ordinances concerning the appointment of deputy High Court judges
and the judicial immunity provided to inferior court judges are patently in-
consistent with the Basic Law. Appointing temporary and part-time judges
without ensuring their independence has been rejected by jurisprudence in
Australia, Canada, and Great Britain and disapproved of by international
standards. The Basic Law firmly entrenches the doctrine of judicial indepen-
dence and provides a supporting framework for its successful operation. The
drafters of the Basic Law could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen
all the consequences of maintaining the judicial system previously practised
in Hong Kong. In ensuring the express provisions of the Basic Law are opera-
tional notwithstanding the continuation of the previous legal system, the
Basic Law expressly states its supremacy over all laws of the HKSAR. "I All
laws in the previous judicial system must be construed with such modifications,
adaptations, limitations, and exceptions as may be necessary so as not to con-
travene the Basic Law."' Accordingly, the judicial system should ensure that
members of the judiciary are independent. Any judicial appointment should
guarantee that the appointee is able and may be seen to perform his or her
judicial functions independently, free from any interference. All members of
the judiciary should be given full judicial immunity and security of tenure.
The validity of judicial decisions made by members of the judiciary who are
not perceived to be independent is questionable. The conflict between main-
taining the previous system of judicial appointment and removal and the
independence of the judiciary should be resolved by adopting a purposive
approach in interpreting the Basic Law.
Any legislative change for the "judicial appointment" provisions to con-
form to the Basic Law requirements would await a successful court challenge
unless the Executive Government, enjoying the status quo, first took the
initiative. Therefore the legal profession and the judiciary have the responsi-
bility to uphold judicial independence themselves. Although the legal
profession in the HKSAR is generally independent of the Executive
Government, it does not follow that no practitioner would compromise inde-
pendence for monetary reward. The Chief Justice has the power to appoint
Senior Counsel."' Members of the legal profession who are deputy judges,
recorders, and Senior Counsel tend to enjoy a higher reputation and, hence,
174 Art 8 of the Basic Law.
175 Section 2A(1) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance.
176 Section 31A of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159).
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command higher fees. The question is whether they would perceive
challenging the power of the Chief Justice in appointing temporary and part-
time members of the judiciary as jeopardizing their career advancement. One
former Hong Kong magistrate, who questioned the independence of the
judiciary, put it:
"The pursuit of independence is the pursuit of impartiality. Impartiality is
a state of mind and the mind of man can be affected by the real as by the
spectral; by intended results as by unintended. The state of mind to which
regard must be had is that of the judge.""'
A few former members of the judiciary have alleged that, under the judi-
cial system in former Hong Kong as maintained by the HKSAR, their
independence had been compromised."'
The implementation of the judicial independence provisions of the Basic
Law very much depends on how they are interpreted by the judiciary. As the
HKSAR is to exercise a high degree of autonomy under the Basic Law, the
judiciary plays a crucial role in protecting the constitutional rights of all
HKSAR residents. In preserving "one country, two systems" and ensuring fair
elections, an impartial judiciary is crucial. Without the rule of law and judi-
cial independence, a democratic society cannot function. The paradox is that
how the Hong Kong judiciary would approach the construction of the provi-
sions supporting judicial independence in the Basic Law depends on whether
they are themselves independent. The judicial appointment provisions
invest the Chief Justice with power to appoint temporary magistrates and
judges, an executive discretion which may well go beyond the incidental
power in the exercise of his or her judicial functions. This is radically differ-
ent from being a member of the judicial appointment commission, whose
power of selection can hardly be challenged. Whilst there is no evidence to
suggest that the Chief Justice would not exercise his or her power
independently, judicial bias may unfortunately be perceived by some. This is
an unfair burden to place on any Chief Justice. It is the task of the legislature,
at the behest of the Executive Government, to implement safeguards as
discussed in this article to ensure that temporary and part-time judicial
appointments do not jeopardise judicial independence.
177 E. Barnes, "The Independence of the Judiciary in Hong Kong" (1976) 6 HKLJ 7, p 19.
178 See Chui (n 156 above), pp 47-60, 67-73; Barnes (n 177 above) (a judicial officer's job could be
made miserable with his or her promotional opportunity at risk if he or she defied the administra-
tive branch).
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